-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Aruba Wireless Networks Security Advisory Title: IPsec configurations may be vulnerable to information disclosure Aruba Advisory ID: AID-051005 Revision: 1.0 For Public Release on 05/10/2005 at 20:00 (GMT) References: NISCC Vulnerability Advisory IPsec - 004033 CERT Vulnerability Report: VU#302220 CVE number: CAN-2005-0039 - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY The NISCC (UK National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre) has made public an advisory that describes three attacks that apply to certain configurations of IPsec. IP Security (IPsec) is a set of protocols developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to support secure exchange of packets at the IP layer; IPsec has been deployed widely, including wireless lan environments, to implement Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). These three attacks apply to certain IPsec configurations that use Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) in tunnel mode with confidentiality only, or with integrity protection being provided by a higher layer protocol. Some configurations using AH to provide integrity protection are also vulnerable. None of the Aruba Wireless Networks products are affected by any of the three specified attacks. PRODUCTS AND FIRMWARE VERSIONS AFFECTED Hardware: None of the Aruba Wireless Networks devices are affected Software: None of the Aruba Wireless Networks software versions are affected DETAILS The IP Security (IPsec) protocol suite are IETF standards commonly used to provide secure networking facilities at the IP level mostly for creating Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Within the IPsec suite, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol provides confidentiality for packets by applying encryption algorithms to the packets, along with several other services. The Authentication Header (AH) protocol can be used to complement the ESP functionality with integrity protection. Both the ESP and AH protocols can be used in either "Transport" or "Tunneling" mode. When Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption, which has a well-known set of flaws allowing bit-flipping attacks, is used by ESP in tunneling mode to provide confidentiality guarantees without proper integrity protection for inner (tunneled) packets, attackers may be able to perform the following attacks: - Destination Address Rewriting: The destination IP address of the inner, encrypted packet is modification in a bit-flipping attack. Intermediate gateways may then route the inner packet to the modified destination address once the inner packet is recovered. - IP Options modification: The header length and source address of the inner packet is modified by performing a bit-flipping attack on the outer payload. Once the modified inner packet is recovered, the structure of the packet may be affected in such a manner that an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Parameter Problem message is generated and sent to the source address of the inner packet along with the plaintext payload. This may be intercepted, leading to a recovery of the original inner packet plaintext payload. - Protocol Field modification: In a similar manner to the IP Options modification attack, the protocol field and source address of the inner packet are modified in a bit-flipping attack against the outer packet payload. An invalid or unusable value in the protocol field may then cause a system which is processing a recovered inner packet to generate an ICMP Protocol Unreachable message. This ICMP message isi then sent back to the (modified) source address with the plaintext payload of the inner packet, which may be intercepted in order to recover the plaintext. These attacks involve an amount of probabilistic success, but any successful attacks disclose information which makes future attacks more efficient. This may allow for automated plaintext recovery with a minimal amount of effort. The underlying problem is the use of CBC mode encryption used for confidentiality, which is susceptible to known attacks that allow the encrypted data to be modified in a known manner. If integrity protection is not applied in a proper fashion to this encrypted data, the change may be undetected and accepted as authentic packet(s). For further details, please visit NISCC's advisory at http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050509-00386.html?lang=en IMPACT Aruba switches are not affected by any of the three attacks described in the NISCC vulnerability advisory since Aruba's implementation of IPsec always requires integrity protection and also does not support AH in transport mode. WORKAROUNDS There is no need for a specific workaround to be implemented. SOLUTION None of the Aruba Wireless Networks products are affected. OBTAINING FIXED FIRMWARES Aruba customers can obtain the firmware on the support website. Aruba Support contacts are as follows: 1-800-WiFiLAN (1-800-943-4526) (toll free from within North America) +1-408-754-1200 (toll call from anywhere in the world) e-mail: support(at)arubanetworks.com web: http://www.arubanetworks.com/support Please, do not contact either "wsirt(at)arubanetworks.com" or "security(at)arubanetworks.com" for software upgrades. EXPLOITATION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS This vulnerability will be announced at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt/alerts/aid-05102005.asc http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050509-00386.html?lang=en http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/302220 STATUS OF THIS NOTICE: Final Although Aruba Wireless networks cannot guarantee the accuracy of all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the best of our ability. Aruba Wireless Networks does not anticipate issuing updated versions of this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should there be a significant change in the facts, Aruba Wireless Networks may update this advisory. A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. DISTRIBUTION OF THIS ANNOUCEMENT This advisory will be posted on Aruba's website at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt/alerts/aid-05102005.asc Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Aruba's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. REVISION HISTORY Revision 1.0 /05-10-2005 / Initial release ARUBA WSIRT SECURITY PROCEDURES Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Aruba Wireless Networks products, obtaining assistance with security incidents is available at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt.php For reporting *NEW* Aruba Wireless Networks security issues, email can be sent to wsirt(at)arubanetworks.com or security(at)arubanetworks.com. For sensitive information we encourage the use of PGP encryption. Our public keys can be found at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt.php (c) Copyright 2005 by Aruba Wireless Networks, Inc. This advisory may be redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including all date and version information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFGeFmJp6KijA4qefURAthKAKDDIl6P/w40Gzj4SarCe2jt9vv2EwCeILvi fzMaaS/jKInEBvIq332EAx4= =fRNw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----